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CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES A SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS
MOTION UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996.1
,

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Courts of Appeal are divided over the question of
what constitutes a successive habeas corpus appeal under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("ADEPA").2 Specifically, the
circuit courts have split over the issue of whether a prisoner's second
habeas corpus petition should be considered successive, and, therefore,
prohibited if the prisoner was forced to use his first petition to merely reestablish the right to appeal his sentence or conviction because his lawyer
failed to file a timely notice of appeal.3 This Note addresses this division
by examining the Fourth Circuit's decision in the Goddard 4 case and the
Fifth Circuit's ruling in the Orozco-Ramirez 5 case.6
Habeas Corpus allows a prisoner to challenge his imprisonment on
the grounds that they are in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.' The United States Congress passed ADEPA in April
1996 with the purpose of attempting to inject finality into criminal
1 See Antiterrorism and Effective Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§2241-2261. t
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2261; Compare In re: Goddard 170 F.3d 435 (4 " Cir.

2

1998) (holding first post conviction appeal to re-instate ripht of direct appeal not second or
successive); Shepeck v. United States, 150 F.3d 800 (7' Cir. 1998) (determining habeas
corpus motion re-establishing appeal rights allows subsequent motion for direct appeal);
United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d 1328 (10"' Cir. 1997) (holding motion reinstating direct
appeal does not render first subsequent motion successive), with United States v. OrozcoRamirez, 211 F.3d 862 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding first appeal following re-establishment of
right to appeal as successive); Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54 (1 Cir. 1997) (ruling
second habeas corpus motion successive when first motion sought out of time appeal).
3 See, e.g. Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 862 (holding habeas corpus motion
successive when following motion re-establising appeal rights); Goddard, 170 F.3d at 345
(allowing one collateral attack once appeal rights re-established.
170 F.3d 435 (4' Cir. 1998).
211 F.3d 1328 (5"h Cir. 2000).
6 See Orozco-Ramirez, 170 F.3d at 345 (applying strict ADEPA interpretation
to
successive habeas corpus petitions); Goddard, 170 F.3d at 345(holding re-establishing
appeal rights does not preclude one post-conviction attack).
7 EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 837-38 (Aspen Law and
Business 1999) (outlining purpose for applying writ of habeas corpus).
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decisions by severely limiting not only habeas corpus' scope, but also
curtailing prisoners' access to it. 8 ADEPA prohibited prisoners from
having successive habeas corpus petitions from being heard in United
States District Court unless the court received permission from the United
States Courts of Appeals. 9 Under ADEPA §2241, a prisoner must file a
motion with the United States Court of Appeals requesting that the district
court be allowed to hear the successive appeal.'0 The United States Court
of Appeals, however, can only grant the district court permission to hear a
successive habeas corpus petition in two scenarios." The prisoner must
either demonstrate that his claim is rooted in a new rule of constitutional
law that applies retroactively, or that his claim is based upon facts that
could not have been previously discovered, and those facts demonstrate
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the offense. 12
In addition to prohibiting successive habeas corpus petitions,
ADEPA further limited habeas corpus through the imposition of a one year
statute of limitations for prisoners to raise habeas corpus claims.13 ADEPA
stipulates additionally that a prisoner in state custody cannot be granted
habeas corpus relief merely because a state court misapplied constitutional
principles. 14 Where a misapplication of constitutional principles has
occurred, habeas corpus relief can only be granted where a state court has
ruled contrary to, or made an unreasonable application of, federal law
established by the Supreme Court of the United States.' 5 Furthermore,
ADEPA provides greater deference to a trial court's factual determinations
by presuming that all factual issues determined at trial are correct. 16 This
presumption is rebuttable only if the prisoner demonstrates through clear
and convincing evidence that those facts are incorrect. 17

8

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat 1241.
9 28 U.S.C. §2244 (mandating dismissal of successive habeas corpus petitions unless
court approves under narrow exceptions).
0 28 U.S.C. §2241 (requesting United States Court of Appeals' permission to have
successive petition heard).
1 Id. (explaining conditions for successive appeal).
12 Id. (outlining scenarios where permission for successive appeal granted).
'" 28 U.S.C. §2255. The statute of limitations runs from the latest of the following
times: 1) the time at which the judgment of the conviction becomes final, 2) the time in
which an impediment to making a motion that was created by the government is removed,
3) the time at which the right of a habeas corpus appeal was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court and 4) the time where the factual predicate of the claim presented could
have been discovered through reasonable diligence. Id.
14 28 U.S.C. §2254 (d).
15 Id.
16 28 U.S.C. §2254 (e).
17

Id.
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Part One of this note explains the circumstances that first led
Mervyn Goddard, and later Javier Orozco-Ramirez, to file motions with
the United States Court of Appeals requesting the district courts be allowed
to hear the habeas corpus claims. 18 Part One also explains how in these
two cases the Fourth and Fifth Circuit reached opposite conclusions when
faced with very similar factual scenarios. 9 Part Two places ADEPA in
historical context and examines its relationship to recent Supreme Court
decisions that have significantly narrowed the writ of habeas corpus'
scope. 20 Part Three analyzes the Goddard and Orozco-Ramirez decisions
and places them within the context of other circuit court interpretations of
what constitutes a successive habeas corpus appeal.2'
II. MERVYN GODDARD AND JAVIER OROZCO-RAMIREZ
The issue in both Goddard and Orozco-Ramirez was whether or not
a subsequent habeas corpus petition was considered successive under
ADEPA when the first petition was used merely to reinstate a prisoner's
right to a direct criminal appeal.22 In August 1993, Mervyn Goddard pled
guilty to three counts of federal drug offenses. 23 Four months following
his conviction, Goddard was sentenced to 120 months in prison followed
by ten years of supervised release.24 Goddard failed to appeal his
sentence.25 In March 1996, Goddard filed a pro se §2255 motion in district
court. 26
The motion claimed that Goddard's lawyer ignored his
instructions to appeal his sentence.27
18 See Orozco-Ramirez, 211

F.3d at 863-64; Goddard, 170 F.3d at 435-37.

(explaining how both petitions lost right of appeal through ineffective assistance of
counsel).
19 Compare Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 866-70 (holding first appeal following reestablishment of right to appeal as successive), with Goddard, 170 F.3d at 437-38 (holding
first post conviction appeal to re-instate right of direct appeal not successive).
20 See 142 Cong. Rec. H3599-01 (April 18, 1996) (stating recent events obligated
ADEPA's passage); e.g. Brecht v. Abrahamson 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (limiting harmless
error review to constitutional errors causing substantial or injurious effect on jury verdict);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (barring retroactive application of new laws to habeas
corpus cases nonexistent before appeal); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (establishing
deference to state courts' findings of fact); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (excluding
4t h Amendment claims from habeas corpus relief).
21 See Note. I supra.
22 See generally Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 863; Goddard, 170 F.3d at 435.
23 Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436. Mervyn Goddard violated drug laws under
21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 and 846.
24
25
26

Id.
id.

Id. A §2255 motion is a habeas corpus petition for those prisoners in federal

custody. 28 U.S.C. §2255.
27 Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436.
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The District Court granted his motion ruling that Goddard failed to
file a timely appeal because he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel. 28 It thus granted Goddard ten days to note an appeal. 29 The
District Court, however, denied Goddard's appeal and imposed his original
sentence.3 0 The Fourth Circuit later affirmed this ruling.3'
In March 1998, Goddard filed another §2255 motion in district
court asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during
his original 1993 sentencing hearing.32 The District Court ruled that this
motion was successive and that, under ADEPA, the District Court could
only consider it if the court received authorization from the United States
Court of Appeals.33 The court therefore, dismissed the case without
prejudice, and Goddard filed a §2244 motion seeking the Fourth Circuit's
permission for his second §2255 motion to be heard on the merits.3 4 In
March 1999, the Fourth Circuit ruled that when a defendant used his first
post-conviction motion, as Goddard did, only for the purpose of reinstating
their right 35of appeal, the subsequent post conviction motion was not
successive.
One year after the Goddard decision, the Fifth Circuit, presented
with very similar facts, reached the opposite conclusion in the OrozcoRamirez case. 36 Like Mervyn Goddard, Javier Orozco-Ramirez was
sentenced to prison in 1993 after he pled guilty to committing federal drug
offenses in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas.37 He was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment and four years of
supervised release. 38 Like Goddard, he failed to file a timely notice of
appeal of his sentence.39
In January 1995, however, Orozco-Ramirez filed a habeas corpus
motion under §2255 for the purpose of challenging his sentence.40 Like
Goddard, Orozco-Ramirez claimed that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to file a timely notice of
28
29

Id.
Id. Goddard appealed his conviction claiming judicial errors in determining the

quantity of drugs in his possession for the purpose of determining his sentence. Id. He
claimed additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
30

Id.

31 Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436.
32

Id.
Id.; See also 28 U.S.C. §§2255 and 2244 (b) (3).
34 Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436.

33

15
36

Id. at 435.

Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 862.

37 Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 863. Orozco-Ramirez pled guilty to distribution of

heroin and conspiracy to distribute heroin.
Goddard's offense and sentence).

Id.; Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436 (describing

38

Id.

39

Id; See Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436 (stating no timely appeal of sentence filed).

40 Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 862.
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appeal after having been asked to.4 1 In January 1996, a magistrate court
recommended, and the district court accepted, that Orozco-Ramirez receive
an out of time appeal. 42 Two days following this decision Orozco-Ramirez
filed a notice of his intention to appeal his 1993 conviction and sentence.43
Orozco-Ramirez obtained a new lawyer and, on direct appeal, raised
matters regarding the quantity of drugs that formed the basis of his
sentence in 1993. 44 The Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the sentence.4 5
One year later, Orozco-Ramirez filed a pro se and in forma pauperis §2255
motion to vacate his 1993 conviction and sentencing. 46 His claim asserted
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing,
ineffective assistance of counsel that rendered his guilty pleas
involuntarily, and ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the handling
of his out of time appeal. 47 The magistrate court recommended the second
§2255 motion's dismissal because it constituted a successive motion under
ADEPA.48 The District Court agreed and Orozco-Ramirez filed a §2244
motion asking the Fifth Circuit to allow his motion to be heard. 49 In
contrast to the Fourth Circuit's decision in the Goddard case, the Fifth
Circuit held that Orozco-Ramirez's claims that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial rendered his second §2255 motion as
successive and was, therefore, ineligible to be heard on the merits.50
III. ADEPA AND HABEAS CORPUS IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The circuit split outlined in the Goddard and Orozco-Ramirez cases
illustrates that neither ADEPA nor the United States Supreme Court clearly
articulated what constitutes a successive appeal. 5' What is clear, however,
41

Id; See Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436 (stating Goddard's ineffective assistance of

counsel claim).
42

Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 863.

43 Id.
44

Id,

45 Id. at 864.
46

Id.

47 Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 864.
48 Id. at 864.
49 Id.

50 Compare Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 868-70 (holding motion containing
previous claims successive, with Goddard, 170 F.3d at 438 (holding ineffective assistance
of counsel claim not successive). The court ruled, however, that Orozco-Ramirez claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel during his out of time were not successive. Id. at 438.
51 See Orozco-Rameriz, 211 F.3d at 867 (stating ADEPA does not define
"successive"); Goddard, 170 F.3d at 438 (describing differing interpretations of successive
petition); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 937 (1998) (proclaiming motion not
successive merely because second or subsequent); Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1618
(determining petition filed after mixed petition dismissed before any claims adjudicated
non-successive); 28 U.S.C. §2255. This section merely states that a successive motion
must be certified by the United States Court of Appeals without elaboration. Id.
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is that over the past thirty years both Congress and the Supreme Court have
increasingly limited habeas corpus' scope.52 Congress passed ADEPA in
response to a series of terrorist attacks on Americans during the 1980s and
1990s. 53 The most notable of these terrorist attacks were the bombings of
Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, the World Trade
Center in New York City during February1993, of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995. 54 ADEPA, however, had little
to do with preventing terrorism: Rather, ADEPA focused primarily upon
curbing what many conservative members of Congress perceived to be a
rampant abuse of habeas corpus by prisoners who filed delayed or
repetitive petitions.56 This perceived abuse was curtailed through ADEPA
§§ 2254 and 2255. 57 Although § 2254 limits habeas corpus motions for
prisoners in state custody and § 2255 limited habeas corpus motions for
those in federal custody, the two sections are substantively identical.58
Both sections prohibit prisoners from having a successive habeas corpus
motion heard on the merits in district court without United States Court of
Appeals authorization.5 9
52

See, e.g. Brecht v. Abrahamson 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (limiting harmless error

review's scope); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (proscribing new laws' retroactive
application to habeas corpus claims); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (deferring to
state court factual determinations); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (excluding fourth
amendment claims from habeas corpus motions); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2261.
53 142 Cong. Rec. H3599-01 (April 18, 1996) (noting Representative Pryce's
statement). During debate in the House of Representatives Pryce argued:
So as we near the one year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, I urge the
house to. . .send a clear signal to would be terrorists that their, cowardly,
destructive acts will not be tolerated by the American people or this institution.
For the victims of Oklahoma City and victims of other tragic events. . . I urge
your support.
Id.

Id.
55 Id. (noting Representative Gekas's statement during floor debate). Gekas argued:
When we see the World Trade Center tragedy and other terrorism... we need the
death penalty ... we have before us a habeas corpus procedure that (allows) a
killer who viciously kills hundreds of people in one act (to) sit in his sell sit in his
cell and file paper after paper, habeas corpus and other documents to prevent the
ultimate punishment.

Id. Not every member of Congress shared this view: See 142 Cong. Rec. H3599-01 (April
18, 1996) (expressing dissenting view of Representative Watt). Watt argued that "We are
about to perpetuate a fraud on the American People, because this bill is not any longer
about terrorism ... we are unfortunately using these two terrorist acts as the predicate for
undoing some important constitutional protections." Id.
56

Id.

5' 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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There are only two ways in which the United States Court of
Appeals will allow a successive motion to be heard on the merits. 60 The
first way is if the prisoner demonstrates that his claim is based upon a new
rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively. 6' The Supreme Court
defined a new rule of constitutional law in its Teague 62 decision as, "one
that breaks new ground or imposes new obligations on the States of
Federal government".63 A case announces a new rule, "if the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final." 64 A new rule can only be applied retroactively, according
to the Teague decision, if the rule places a primacy on private individual
conduct beyond lawmakers' ability to prescribe, or the rule adopts a
procedure "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty., 65 Therefore under
ADEPA there are, "essentially no new rules can be asserted on habeas
corpus claims." 66 A prisoner can thus only be granted habeas corpus when
his petition asserts claims based upon clearly established constitutional
rights. 67
The second way the United States Court of Appeals will authorize a
successive petition's hearing on the merits is when the factual basis for the
prisoner's claim, "could not have been discovered previously and those
facts establish clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder
would have found the prisoner guilty of the offenses for which they were
convicted. '68 If the United States Court of Appeals fails to grant the
district court authorization to hear the successive motion on the merits,
ADEPA prohibits the prisoner from appealing the decision to the Supreme
Court. 69

Article III of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to limit the federal courts' jurisdiction over habeas corpus
motions. 70 ADEPA and other past limitations placed upon the federal
courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction were designed to inject finality into an
appellate process that Congress believed not only delayed sentences from

60 28 U.S.C. §2244.
61 Id.
62
63

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 301. See ERWIN

CHEMERINSKI,

FEDERAL JURISDICTIoN

872-888 (1999)

(discussing impact and application of Teague rules).
64 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
65 Id. at 307.
66 ERWIN CHEMERINSKi, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 880-81 (1999).
67 Id.
68 Teague 489 U.S. at 301.
69 Id.
70

U.S.

CONST. Art. II § 2.

It reads, "the supreme court shall have appellate

Jurisdiction , both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as
Congress shall make." Id.
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being carried out, but also unduly congested the federal courts. 71 Congress
originally intended habeas corpus to apply only to those prisoners in
federal custody and did not intend to include prisoners in state custody.72
In 1867, Congress expanded habeas corpus and allowed the federal courts
jurisdiction over all cases where an individual had his liberty restrained in
violation of either the Constitution or any other United States' treaties or
laws.73
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
expanded habeas corpus when it allowed prisoners in state custody to
challenge their state court convictions and sentences in federal court.74 In
Brown v. Allen 75 the Supreme Court ruled that a person convicted in state
court who had fully litigated their constitutional claims at the state level
may raise constitutional issues on a habeas corpus claim in federal court.76
The Court reasoned that this extension of habeas corpus was necessary
because too often state courts failed to protect a defendant's federal
constitutional rights.77 By the late 1960s, the Court expanded habeas
corpus further and allowed federal prisoners to submit habeas motions on
constitutional issues that had been decided previously at trial. 78 The Court
stated that because constitutional rights were of such fundamental
79
importance, the federal courts must provide a mechanism of relief.
This expansion has not lasted, however, because over the past thirty
years, the Supreme Court has steadily reduced the scope and availability of

71 See 142 Cong. Rec. H3599-01 (expressing congressional frustration with habeas
corpus procedure as justification for ADEPA): See e.g. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869) (holding federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction revocable under
Habeas Act of 1867); Ex parte Yerger, 75 (8 Wall.) 85 (1869) (declaring 1868 Habeas Act
did not deprive courts from hearing petitions under 1789 Habeas Act). WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE, (Vintage Books 1998) (describing limits placed on
habeas corpus in wartime).
72 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (tracing habeas corpus' legislative and
judicial history in United States); Ex parte Dorr, (3 How.) 103 (1845) (declaring writ of
habeas corpus availability exclusively for federal prisoners); Habeas Act of Feb. 5 1867, ch.
28, 14 Stat. 385 (allowing habeas corpus for all prisoners whose incarceration violated state
or federal law).
73 See Felker, 518 U.S. at 659 (tracing expansion of habeas corpus during nineteenth
century); Habeas Act of Feb. 5 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. Prior to the 1867 Act, the only
way in which a federal court could issue a writ of habeas corpus was if it was necessary for
the prisoner to testify. Habeas Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 14.
74 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433 (1953)
(establishing state prisoners right to argue federal constitutional claims in federal court).
7' 344 U.S. 433 (1953).
76 Id. at 511.
77 Id.
78 See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (stating constitutional issues

appropriate for federal prisoners to re-litigate in habeas corpus claims).
9 Id. at 226.
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habeas corpus claims. 80 ADEPA essentially codified these common law
reductions. 81 In 1991, five years prior to ADEPA's enactment, the
Supreme Court introduced similar standards designed to prevent perceived
habeas corpus abuse.82 Like Congress, the Court was concerned with the
finality of judgments.8 3 The Court held in its McCleskey 84 decision that a
prisoner may not file a successive habeas corpus motion that presented a
new legal issue unless he could show cause as to why that issue was
h prisoner demonstrates cause,
Once the
omitted from the previous motion. 85 Oc
the government must prove that the successive habeas corpus motion
represents an abuse of the writ. 86 The government can prove this by
merely demonstrating that the new motion presented new legal issues.87
Once this is established, the prisoner must explain why the new claim was
omitted from the earlier petition and demonstrate actual prejudice.88
Alternatively, the prisoner can argue that the successive petition's
dismissal would constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 89 The
Court reasoned that allowing prisoners to continuously file successive
habeas corpus motions that included new claims engendered "perpetual
disrespect for the finality of convictions and disparages the entire criminal
justice system.' 9

80 See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619 (limiting scope of harmless error review); Teague, 489
U.S. at 539 (prohibiting retroactive application of new laws to habeas corpus claims);
Sumner, 449 U.S. at 539 (establishing deference towards state courts' factual
determinations); Stone, 428 U.S. at 465 (excluding 4th amendment claims from habeas
corpus motions).
81 See Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (tracing relationship between legislative actions and
judicial rulings regarding habeas corpus); McCleskey v. Zant, 449 U.S. 467 (1991)
(outlining burden placed upon judicial branch by repetitive habeas corpus motions).
82 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 467 (describing negative effects of petitioners
abusing
habeas corpus). The Court stated that these effects included a, "heavy burden on scarce
judicial resources" and threatens courts' ability, "to resolve primary disputes." Id. at 491.
The Court further reasoned that habeas corpus review gave litigants an incentive to
withhold claims "for manipulative purposes." Id. Lastly, the Court stated that successive
habeas corpus motions "extends the ordeal for society and the accused." Id. at 492.
83 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 467; 142 Cong. Rec. H3599-01 (expressing
concerns
over numerous habeas corpus motions).
'4 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
85 Id. at 494.
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id.

89

McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95.

90 Id. at 491-92.
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IV. DEFINING SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS MOTIONS UNDER
GODDARD AND OROZCO-RAMIREZ
While ADEPA does not define what a successive habeas corpus
motion is, the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals have
attempted to inject some clarity into the discussion. 9' The Supreme Court
has held that a habeas corpus motion was not successive merely because it
was numerically second or subsequent to a previous motion.92 The Court
reasoned that a § 2254 or § 2255 motion could not be considered
successive if the previous motion was dismissed for reasons such as failing
to exhaust state remedies, failure to pay a court filing fee, or because the
motion raised an unripe legal issue. 93 This list, however, may not be
definitive because, as the Goddard and Orozco-Ramirez cases illustrate,
the federal courts disagree over the question of whether a § 2255 motion is
to be considered subsequent when a prior motion was used merely to reinstate a prisoner's right of appeal. 94
In its Goddard opinion, the Fourth Circuit held that when a
defendant used his first post conviction appeal solely to reinstate their right
to a direct appeal, their first subsequent post-conviction motion is not
successive. 95 According to the Fourth Circuit, Goddard's first § 2255
motion was a restorative measure designed to place him in, "the same
96
position as if his lawyer had originally filed a timely notice of appeal."
The court logically concluded that it was meaningless to restore a
prisoner's rights to a direct appeal of their conviction and sentence if a
subsequent motion that requested an appeal was considered successive

91See Stewart, 523 U.S. at 637 (outlining scenarios where subsequent motion not
successive under ADEPA). In re Cain, 137 F.3d 235 (40f Cir. 1998) (holding motion
successive if containing claims that petitioner could have raised in earlier motion); Carlson
v. Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416 (6' Cir. 1998) (stating under ADEPA, § 2254 motion subsequent
to motion dismissed for failure to exhaust not successive); Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d
162 (holding § 2255 motion dismissed for failure to pay filing fee does not render
subsequent motion successive); Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1997)
(ruling that motion mislabeled as §2255 motions does not render next motion successive).
2 Stewart, 523 U.S. at 642-44.
93 Id.

94Compare Goddard, 170 F.3d at 435; (holding § 2255 motion not subsequent
because first motion re-instated right of appeal); Shepeck, 150 F.3d at 800 (ordering §2255
motion to permit appeal rests number of collateral attacks to zero); Scott, 124 F.3d at 1328
(ruling second motion not subsequent when first reinstated right of appeal); with OrozcoRamirez, 211 F.3d at 862 (declaring defendant's second motion claiming ineffective
counsel successive under ADEPA); Pratt, 129 F.3d at 54 (requiring joining all attacks on
judgment and reinstatement claim in first § 2255 motion).
G
Goddard, 170 F.3d at 435.

Id. at 437. The court noted that Goddard's predicament was not his fault. Rather,
his lawyer, "bungled the job" by not realizing there was still time to file an appeal after
Goddard had requested one. Id.
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because such a philosophy unfairly limited the prisoner's post conviction
remedies. 97 Furthermore, the court stressed that to rule Mervyn Goddard's
second § 2255 motion as successive placed him at an extreme disadvantage
to those prisoners whose lawyers complied with their appeal requests.98
The Fourth Circuit's ruling was influenced by the Tenth Circuit's
decision in the Scott99 case. 1°° The facts in the Goddard and Scott cases are
nearly identical. 10 1 In the Scott decision, the prisoner, Wallie Scott, filed a
§ 2255 motion with the district court asserting that his lawyer failed to file
an appeal. 10 2 After Wallie Scott's § 2255 motion was granted and he was
re-sentenced, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on
appeal. 103 Scott then filed a second § 2255 motion that asserted he
received ineffective assistance of counsel both at his trial and during the
appeal. 1°4 The Tenth Circuit stated, using language the Fourth Circuit
adopted later in the Goddard case, that the purpose of Scott's first § 2255
motion and appeal was to place him, "back in the position he would have
been had counsel perfected a timely notice of appeal."' 1 5 The court argued
in its Scott opinion that, under the Supreme Court's Stewart ruling, a
second § 2255 motion that claimed ineffective assistance of counsel during
an appeal could not be construed as successive because such a claim could
not exist before the appeal was completed. 106
While the Fourth Circuit's Goddard opinion adopted the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in the Scott decision, it rejected the First Circuit's Pratt
ruling that required prisoners to join all other claims concerning their
conviction and sentence that could have been raised on direct appeal to
their initial § 2255 motion.'0 7 The Fourth Circuit criticized the rationale
behind the Pratt decision and argued, "that such an approach diminished
97 id.
98 Id. at 438.

99 124 F.3d 1328 (1997).
See Goddard, 170 F.3d at 437 (noting Scott decision's influence); Scott, 124 F.3d
at 1328 (ruling second § 2255 motion non-successive because first used to re-instate appeal
rights).
'0' Compare Goddard, 170 F.3d at 436 with Scott, 124 F.3d at 1328. Like Mervyn
Goddard, Wallie Scott was convicted on federal drug charges. Scott was convicted of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession with the intent to
contribute cocaine base. Scott, 124 F.3d at 1328. Like, Mervyn Goddard, Wallie Scott's
lawyer ignored a request to appeal the conviction and sentence. Id.
100

102

Scott, 124 F.3d at 1328.

103
104

Id. at 1328.

105

See Goddard, 170 F.3d at 437-39 (allowing one habeas corpus appeal following

Id.

appeal right's restoration); Scott, at 1329 (holding appeal rights re-establishment permits
one attack on sentence or conviction).
106 Scott 124 F.3d at 1329.; see also Stewart, 118 F.3d at 628 (ruling that first habeas
motion dismissed for unripeness does not render second motion successive).
107 See Goddard, 170 F.3d at 438 (citing Pratt, 129
F.3d at 54).
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the value of a reinstated appeal right."1 °8 While it agreed with the First
Circuit's belief that ADEPA's provisions were "strict", the Fourth Circuit
believed that those provisions allowed one collateral attack on a conviction
or sentence after a prisoner re-established his direct appeal rights. 1°9 The
Fourth Circuit noted correctly that the First Circuit's approach essentially
denied a prisoner's right to counsel because, where a prisoner § 2255
motion already claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, the requirement
to join all other claims to that motion forced them to make substantive
objections to their conviction and sentence without a lawyer's guidance. 110
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit's Orozco-Ramirez
opinion held that Orozco-Ramirez's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial constituted a successive § 2255 motion under ADEPA."'
Under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, a § 2255 motion was successive when it
raised claims challenging a prisoner's conviction or sentence that could
have been raised in an earlier § 2255 motion used solely to reinstate the
right of direct appeal.1 2 Javier Orozco-Ramirez argued that under the
Fourth Circuit's Goddard opinion, his first § 2255 motion merely
reinstated his right to appeal, so the second § 2255 motion claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial could not be considered
successive. 3 While the Fifth Circuit conceded that the Goddard opinion
was "directly on point", the court declined to follow it." 4 The Fifth Circuit
explicitly rejected the Goddard opinion and stated that the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning violated not only ADEPA's spirit, but also the Supreme Court's
desire, as expressed in its Stewart ruling, to bring finality and res judicata
principles to habeas corpus."15 Furthermore, the court believed that the
Goddard opinion essentially stood for the proposition that the question of
whether or not a subsequent § 2255 motion was successive depended,
"upon the first motion's success in gaining an out of time appeal"."56
Rather than adopt this philosophy, the Fifth Circuit adopted the First
Circuit's more stringent reasoning in the Pratt opinion." 7 According to
the Fifth Circuit, there was nothing inherently unfair in forcing Orozco-8
Ramirez in join all of his collateral claims in his first § 2255 motion."
108 Goddard, 170 F.3d at 438.
109 Id.

'10 See id. at 438.
111 Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 862.
"' Id at 867.
113 Orozeo-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 869.
114 Id.
11' Id. at 870, 28 U.S.C §§2241-2261. See also Stewart, 532 U.S. at 673 (outlining
Supreme Court's res judicata philosophy regarding habeas corpus); Goddard, 170 F.3d at
435 (discussing second appeal's curative effect regarding ineffective assistance of counsel).
116 Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 870.
117 Id. at 870; Pratt, 129 F.3d at 61.
118 Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 869.
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The court argued prisoners like Orozco-Ramirez's should assert all of his
collateral attacks in the initial § 2255 motion "because when filing the
motion he cannot know whether or not his claim seeking an out of time
appeal will be successful." ' 19 Furthermore, if the initial § 2255 motion
was rejected, a subsequent § 2255 motion is successive
if it asserted habeas
20
corpus claims that could have been brought earlier. 1
The Fourth Circuit's Goddard opinion is a more reasonable
interpretation of what constitutes a successive § 2255 motion than the Fifth
Circuit's Orozco-Ramirez ruling because it balances ADEPA's restrictions
and the Supreme Court's desire for finality, with the recognition that
access to effective counsel is essential to insuring a fair trial and appellate
system. 12'The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that a prisoner bears a
substantial burden when he is forced to discern, without the aid of counsel,
what habeas corpus claims he may have at his disposal while seeking an
out of time appeal. 122 The Fifth Circuit essentially ignored this concern
and interpreted far too narrowly ADEPA and the Stewart decision's res
judicata principles to mean literally "one bite at the apple" no matter that a
prisoner was subjected to incompetent legal counsel. 23 The court,
furthermore, appears to have wildly overestimated a prisoner's
ability to
124
act effectively as his own advocate in the appellate process.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Note has explained, ADEPA has significantly curtailed not
only habeas corpus' scope but also the ways in which a prisoner may
employ it to attack his conviction or sentence. Under ADEPA § 2255, a
prisoner is barred from having a subsequent habeas corpus motion heard
on the merits unless it is approved by the United States Court of Appeals.
The new motion is approved if it relies on a new rule of constitutional law
made retroactively applicable by the Supreme Court, or is based on facts
that could not have been previously discoverable. Additionally the United
States Court of Appeals must rule that without the constitutional error, the
prisoner would be found actually innocent.
While ADEPA does not
define what constitutes a successive habeas corpus motion, the Supreme
"9

120

Id. at 870.
Id. at 870.

See Stewart, 523 U.S. at 637 (expressing need for finality in habeas corpus cases);
Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 862 (requiring that initial motion include all habeas claims as
consistent with Stewart); Goddard, 170 F.3d at 437-38 (proclaiming ADEPA allows one
collateral attack following restoration of appeal rights).
122 See Goddard, 170 F.3d at 437-38 (reasoning prisoner should not be penalized
for
ineffective assistance of counsel).
121

123See Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 869-71 (stating fairness of requiring prisoners
to

attach all claims to initial §2255 motion).
124

See id. at 870.
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Court, prior to its passage, had stated that initial § 2255 motions that were
dismissed for reasons such as failing to pay a court filing fee or raising an
unripe legal issue did not render a subsequent § 2255 motion as successive.
Without clear guidance from ADEPA or the Supreme Court, the
Federal Courts of Appeals are divided over whether a second § 2255
motion that challenges a prisoner's conviction or sentence is successive
when the initial motion merely reinstated his right of appeal that was lost
due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority of circuits,
illustrated most recently by the Fourth Circuit's Goddard opinion, have
held that in such cases the subsequent motion is not rendered successive
and, thus, may be heard on the merits. A minority of circuits, as most,
recently illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's Orozco-Ramirez opinion, disagree
with this reasoning and have held that a prisoner must assert all potential
claims related to their conviction and sentence in their initial § 2255
motion.
The Fourth Circuit's Goddard decision represents the best
interpretation of what constitutes a successive appeal under ADEPA. The
Fourth Circuit's interpretation recognizes that while ADEPA was intended
to limit the number of post-conviction appeals a prisoner was entitled to,
ADEPA was not designed to entirely eliminate his rights. The Fifth
Circuit's approach essentially eliminates a prisoner's right to a postconviction when he receives ineffective assistance of counsel. Such an
approach denies a prisoner his due process rights and discriminates against
indigent prisoners who were represented by court appointed lawyers.
Craig lannini

